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Corporate elites, as well as the general populace, frequently equate economic development
with economic growth. Moreover, business and industrial leaders pursue growth almost
indiscriminately, resulting in an ideological consensus (Whitt, 1982; Marcuse, 1982) which
greatly constrains the ability of local governments to enact redistributive public policies.

Local

corporate and political leaders alike "use their growth consensus to eliminate any alternative
vision of the purpose of local government or the meaning of community" (Logan & Molotoch,
1987: 51). The hegemony of the "progrowth agenda" (Reed, 1988: 145) in many urban centers
predates conservative economic policies advanced in the 1980's (Smith & Judd, 1984) but of
late has been especially embraced by the New Right to promote the values of "property rights" at
the expense of "person rights" (Apple, 1989: 34).
The failure to distinguish between economic growth and economic development has led to
the enactment of public policies which have had dire consequences for the underclass, those
"truly disadvantaged" persons (Wilson, 1987) who seem to permanently inhabit impoverished
inner cities. For example, in pursuit of economic growth, and in the name of market ideologies,
the Reagan Administration reduced funding for low income housing by 75% (Jacob, 1988). The
consequences of growth strategies (e.g., privatization) are well known nationally. Less clearly
understood are those processes of social context--history, culture, and ideology (Beauregard,
1984: 58-63), which enable actors to resist the domination tendency of the growth machine. An
empirical study of local ideology in urban settings may, therefore, help document the ideological
hegemony of the progrowth agenda. Smith (1980: 18) is worth quoting at length on this score .
... research in urban studies would benefit from a close examination of the
ideological, cultural, and socialization processes that determine how people in
particular national and class settings come to define their 'interests,' (lliQI to
the point where interests are either factored into politics or deflected from
consideration.
(emphasis added)

New Orleans and the State of Louisiana provide interesting cases to document the hegemony
of growth ideologies and politics. Historically, the state has maintained an anti-business stance
owing to the legacy of Huey Long, who amassed enormous ower by paying for free textbooks,
paving county roads, and--especially--helping to enact the homestead exemption during the
depression years to protect homes and farms from foreclosures. Many of Long's populist policies
were financed by taxes from the oil and gas industries.
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In New Orleans, too, an entrenched social oligarchy prevented, up until very recently,
capital investment and often blocked the financing of entrepreneurial small businessmen and
women (Bobo 1975). Historically local business elites have been divided by "new" versus "old"
money interests (Whalen & Young, 1989); the tensions between uneven development and the
progrowth agenda are particularly acute1, and the hegemony of "property rights" (Apple,
1989: 34) are ensconced institutionally in the state tax code and culturally in the ethos of
historic preservation (Smith & Keller, 1983). As Smith and Keller (1983) assert, the ethos of
preservation has historically placed ideological limits on growth. A widespread acceptance of
growth ideologies, legitimized by the state, would therefore serve as powerful evidence to
document the hegemony of growth forces.

In this article I present a case study of "fiscal reform," a political ideology advanced by
corporate elites in New Orleans and throughout the State of Louisiana to resolve the fiscal crisis
currently experienced by state and local government. I use content analysis, supplemented by
interviews, to study ideology within the framework of critical theory. Specifically, the paper
focuses on the tension between corporate elites' attempts at installing a "corporate regime"
(Stone, 1987; cited in Whalen & Young, 1989) through the use of political ideology and the
resistance presented by middle class homeowners. The paper concludes with the prospects for
corporate hegemony in New Orleans and the implications for the underclass to reap benefits from
a growth strategy or, alternatively, to challenge the growth machine through politically
organized social movements.

A Critical Perspective of Ideology

Critical theorists 2 (Habermas, 1971; Giroux, 1980; Apple, 1989) define ideology as
the "production of sense and meaning" (McLaren, 1989: 177) and tie the function of ideology in
capitalist societies to a theory of domination. Through the use of ideology, unequal power
relations are institutionalized in the schools, churches. governmental agencies and corporate
headquarters. Dominant ideologies, however, are resisted and may actually serve to give rise to
"oppositional" ideologies (McLaren, 1989:178). Thus, dominant ideologies are never fixed;
they are socially constructed and their continued dominance is a problematic function of the
dialectical relationship between structure and human agency.
I distinguish between two kinds of ideologies: hegemonic and political. Following
McLaren (1989:174-176), hegemonic ideologies culturally "encase" meaning. Dominant
groups work to seek the consent of subordinant groups, not by force or coercion, but by
providing moral and intellectual leadership (Gramsci, 1971). Such ideologies structure culture
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and the subjective experience of meaning in a fashion that allows for a "common sense"
worldview subscribed to by both dominant and subordinant groups. By contrast, corporate and
political elites employ political ideologies to manipulate the citizenry into supporting specific
policy proposals or to garner public support for candidates who are favorable to their economic
interests. The purpose of this paper, then, is to document the relationship between the political
ideology of fiscal reform and the ideological hegemony of growth within an attempt by corporate,
governmental, and civic elites to consolidate a corporate regime in New Orleans in the late
1980's.

The Hindrances to Local Economic Growth

Until the 1970's, New Orleans seemed insulated from the need to pursue aggressive
economic development policies aimed at achieving a progrowth agenda. Decades of economic
prosperity derived from profits in oil and gas industries, coupled with one of the country's most
productive ports, and a healthy tourist industry all combined to lull to sleep the city's economic
and political elites. Despite gloomy forecasts from public and private reports which warned of
looming financial disaster, city government did little to ward off a declining revenue base and a
dwindling tax base. New Orleans' revenue and fiscal problems were compounded by a tax
structure which (enshrined in the state constitution) placed severe limits on the city's ability to
raise taxes and by the homestead exemption (also contained in the state's constitution) which
exempted from property taxes the first $75,000 of the assessed value of a home.

Not

insignificantly, city government was marked by a preponderance of independent and
quasi-independent governmental bodies such as the Port of New Orleans, the Audubon Park
Commission, the Tourist Commission, the Downtown Development District, and the Orleans
Parish School Board--all of which greatly facilitated the development of a "caretaker regime"
(Stone, 1987, cited in Whalen & Young, 1989; 2-4) and constrained fragmented attempts to
introduce a corporate regime. The city's seven elected tax assessors underscored the politicized
context of property tax assessment and made consensus-building for gubernatorial and corporate
calls for tax reform difficult to achieve.
This economic and legal framework combined to produce an anti-tax ideology among the
city's middle class homeowners, 85% of whom were exempt from paying any property taxes
(Bureau of Governmental Research, 1987), which prevented business from expanding and
moving forward with economic growth. Business groups complained that they were shouldering
the tax burden and that new businesses would locate to near-by states such as Mississippi and
Tennessee, where the tax burden was smaller.
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A coalition of homeowners, anti-tax activists

and "New Right" fiscal conservatives successfully defeated several tax measures and service
charges during the eight years of the Morial administration (1978-86) and in the early days of
the succeeding Barthelemy term (Whalen & Young, 1989). Taxes of any kind, but especially
property and income taxes, were very difficult to pass, thus, given the perceived corruption of
the political system of taxation and the constitutional limits on individual property taxes.
By the early 1980's the city's financial elite faced a double-edged sword: the collapse of
the world oil market, which witnessed prices to below $10 per barrel, forced the virtual
shutdown of the local oil industry and related service industries. Meanwhile the city was
entering its worst financial crisis in its history, which resulted in a 1/3 reduction in its
operating budget between 1984 and 1988. Business seemed caught in the middle: on the one hand
the oil industry, which was virtually singlehandedly responsible for the revitalization of the
Poydras Street corridor 3, was at a standstill; on the other hand, local government and the public
schools were in dire need of additional revenues and were turning to the business community for
support to raise business and franchise taxes, which corporate leaders had estimated to be
already 69% higher than the southern average. From its vantage point, business could ill-afford
to continue to foot the bill for the services of government.
With the election of governor Buddy Roemer in 1987, business interests statewide, and in
particular within the corporate oil community in New Orleans, had an ally upon whom they could
hope to launch their campaign for reform of the state's political, economic, and educational
system which they felt had led to "redlining" by national business leaders. Roemer, the reform
candidate, was able to win over the state's major newspapers on the promise of integrity in
government and politics and by accepting no campaign contributions over $1 ,000. In defeating
former three-time governor and populist symbol Edwin Edwards, Roemer and his allies in the
state's major corporations were poised to wage the ideological war against populism which would
prove to the corporate community throughout the country and the entire world that Louisiana
was a good state in which to do business. Several months prior to the gubernatorial election, a
network of business, civic, and academic leaders began meeting in the offices of
Freeport-McMoran, the major oil and gas producer in the city, to plan a political strategy for
the enactment of tax reform. These planning meetings eventually produced a detailed
constitutional amendment, which would revamp the state's antiquated tax structure (LCFR
minutes, 1987).
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The Ideology of Reform

In March, 1987, James R. "Jim Bob" Moffett, chairman and chief executive officer of
Freeport-McMoran Corporation (FMC), organized the Louisiana Council for Fiscal Reform
(LCFR), ostensibly to rescue the state from financial ruin. The group, which consisted of major
corporations in Louisiana which had contributed at least $5,000 to the drive for fiscal reform,
comprised what journalists were describing as the "new civic leadership" consisting of the chief
executives of corporations such as FMC, Coca-Cola, CNG (Consolidated Natural Gas), and
Louisiana Land and Exploration Company--all directed by relative newcomers to the city. LCFR
had evolved from a similar group Moffett had organized in New Orleans, the Business Council,
consisting of fifty corporations which donated $20,000 annually to resolve the city's economic,
educational and political problems.
Bodenheimer (1970) asserts that historical ideological movements profess a mythology
which political leaders take for historical fact, and to which they ask the masses to subscribe
when seeking to mobilize society for change. As corporate advocates of change, Moffett and LCFR
sought to dispel the myth of populism. At its core was an indictment of an ideology which dated
from the era of Huey Long. It became clear in one of the first public meetings of the group held
on March 9, that corporate leaders wanted action with respect to an overhaul of the state's tax
structure. They had grown weary of the numerous studies whose detailed policy proposals had
not been implemented. At that meeting LCFR chairman Moffett announced a "grassroots" attack on
Louisiana populism, declaring that, "If you want to be on a sinking ship, then by golly vote for
the status quo." (New Orleans Times-Picayune, 1988g:B-1). Moffett was referring to the
Council's proposal to restructure the state's tax code, bringing the taxes paid by business in line
with the southern average by shifting the tax burden from corporations to individual property
and state income taxes.
Seeking to debunk the myth of populism, LCFR's argument embraced the following
elements:
(1)

Louisiana's populist legacy had deceived its citizens into believing that they could
get something for nothing--the "Louisiana Hayride"--(see McGinnis, 1985) when
in reality it was revenues derived from the oil and gas industries which permitted
the state to enjoy periods of relative economic prosperity.

(2)

The welfare state, which was responsible for producing one of the most extensive
indigent hospital networks in the country, had caused a bloated state government
which was spending in excess of comparable-sized governments in the south (see
Oakland, 1985).

(3)

No incremental approach on behalf of government would provide meaningful
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solutions to the state's chronic fiscal crisis. What was needed was fundamental
change, what corporate leaders branded "fiscal reform."
(4)

Only through fiscal reform could the State expect to produce the necessary jobs and
foster economic development to sustain the quality of life desired by its residents
and reverse the outmigration experienced in the mid-1980's.

Reformist ideology became a concrete legislative proposal when Roemer presented the
Louisiana Council's Fiscal Reform package, with some slight modifications, for approval from
the Louisiana Legislature in a special session held in Fall, 1988. The governor's legislative
initiatives were crafted in the form of two separate constitutional amendments, each of which
would eventually face ratification by the Louisiana electorate in a state-wide referendum.
Roemer's staff characterized one bill, a one thousand page document, as the "largest, most
comprehensive legislation" in the state's history. This legislation would rewrite the Louisiana
tax code which enshrined the homestead exemption, the most generous in the country, in the
state's 1974 constitution. The second bill was the enabling legislation which would provide the
statutory framework to actually implement the rewritten tax code in all of the state's 64
parishes.
Briefly, the legislation at its core embraced three elements which business leaders in
corporate offices in New Orleans and throughout the state contended would lift Louisiana out of
the economic backwaters:
(1)

A reduction of the tax burden on business by repealing the corporate franchise tax,
the inventory ad valorem tax, and the sales tax on equipment, machinery, and
construction materials. Business leaders claimed that such taxes on business and
industry were among the highest in the nation and the highest in the South (LCFR
legislative program, 1988).

(2)

A reduction in the state's homestead exemption from $75,000 to $25,000.
Reducing the state's homestead exemption would broaden the tax base which
according to recent studies, excluded approximately 85% of the city's homeowners
from paying any property taxes (Bureau of Governmental Research, 1987).

(3)

Lowering the state's sales tax and and increasing personal income tax. Economists
and tax consultants to LCFR argued that the regressive sales tax (in New Orleans the
sales tax at 9% is the highest in the country) not only hurt the poor. It would also
cost the state approximately $160 million in lost revenue because sales taxes were
no longer deductible under the provisions of the new federal tax law.

Initially, as this article will detail below, the fiscal reform legislation would produce no
new revenues, but would, instead, be "revenue neutral." Over the long term, however, LCFR
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leaders claimed that the state's budget would be tied to growth income such as the personal
income tax. By reducing the dependence on the oil industry by restructuring the tax system, the
implication was that both state and local governments would benefit economically. A much fuller
discussion of the ideological orientation underpinning these policy proposals will be provided in
the balance of this paper.

A Content Analysis of Local Corporate Ideology

Seider's (1974) content analysis of corporate speechmaking suggests five ideological
themes which may be applied to analyze local corporate ideology in New Orleans. These are:
classical, nationalism, social responsibility, trustee, and professional. The classical theme
represents "the main bulwark of the American business creed" (Sutton, quoted in Seider, 1974:
807). Its major values stem from a belief in the marketplace--free enterprise, profit, and the
internal regulating capacity of the capitalist economic system. Running ideologically counter to
the classical belief in the market is the value of social responsibility. The managers' sense of the
role business plays in the resolution of social problems, the formulation of social policy, and the
philanthropic improvement of the community in general is emphasized. Seider notes that the
value corporate elites place on social responsibility "would be recognized as a major goal of
business, not as an incidental by-product of its day to day operations" (Seider, 1977: 808).
The managerial role of business is stressed in the trustee theme. Here, corporate managers
mediate between the interests of its clients/customers, stockholders, employees, the community
and the public sector.
Similarly, the professional ideological theme focuses upon the corporate manager's
prerequisite skills and specialized technical expertise central to the efficient conduct of the
corporation, business, or industry. Seider speculates that this theme stems from the
development of "conglomerate ideology" where managers must learn to work with cohorts within
and across companies. Finally, nationalistic ideology stresses love and loyalty of the nation, as
opposed to a more narrow sectarian interest in the corporation.
A few of Seider's categories can be dismissed as not relevant to the local "movement" for
fiscal reform in New Orleans. First, nationalistic value preferences clearly do not apply;
however, there is some sentiment of nationalistic fervor as it applies to the state of Louisiana.
The LCFR's unswerving commitment to radical overhaul of the state's tax code, revenue sources,
and decentralized delivery of social services demonstrates, symbolically at least, a universal
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interest in the welfare of the state as a whole. Of course, such rhetoric must be weighed against
some very explicit motivations on behalf of corporations such as Moffett's Freeport-McMoran
and others which would together net approximately $300 million in tax savings under the
Roemer proposal (New Orleans Times-Picayune, 1988d:).
The trustee theme has limitations to this study as well. Since LCFR, and the movement for
fiscal reform, represented an attempt at unification and mobilization of the statewide corporate
community, little, if any, discussion took place as to the interests of stockholders, customers, or
other constituents of the group. Indeed, it was assumed that no mediation of such interests need
occur, since several polls commissioned by the Moffett group indicated overwhelming support
not only for the entire concept attendant legislative proposals, but also the group's commitment
to organize a "grassroots" movement to lobby the legislature and the public for enactment
(Chamber of Commerce, 1988).
Similarly, the theme of corporate social responsibility, on surface, has limited
application. This theme is more complex than the two mentioned above, however, in that it
appears that some of the leaders of LCFR appeared genuinely concerned over the state's future
financial health, in particular as to its ability to attract jobs for its citizenry. On March 13,
1988, the secretary of the group wrote in an editorial to the Times Picayune, the state's largest
newspaper: "Louisiana's excessive business taxes which impose harsh burdens upon new
investment and existing businesses, are the primary cause of the state's economic problems" ...
"We don't need any more studies. Now is the time for action" (New Orleans
Times-Picayune, 1988h: A-26).
This activist posture is significant, given business' history of relative inactivity and the
historical "Mardi Gras" attitude of its elites (Chai, 1971). This attitude may be characterized
as "tied to a traditional ethos and social structure which directed (corporate elites) energies
away from entrepreneurial economic activities" (Smith & Keller, 1983: 132) and a
disinclination towards aggressive promotion of economic development and diversification of the
local economy. Although this trend had softened somewhat during development of the Poydras
Street corridor following construction of the Superdome in the 1970's (Whelan, 1988), local
and corporate elites had remained fragmented in their approach to economic growth and, with
some exceptions, apathetic to politics. Under Moffett's leadership, and the organizational
support of the state's leading corporations, a political consensus on the solution to the state's
economic problems was crafted, seemingly overnight.
No longer content to sit idly watching the deterioration of the economy and the exodus of
many of its residents--New Orleans experienced a net loss of 28,000 residents between 1987
and 1988 (U. S. Census, 1988)--corporate elites apparently saw as their civic and social duty
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to do something about the mammoth problems. An internal memorandum of the precursor to
LCFR, the New Orleans Business Council, strikingly reveals the urgency that local business
elites felt prior to the opening of the 1988 legislative session: "A tax package that does not
address the concerns of New Orleans taxpayers will guarantee that further productive members
of this economic community will move themselves and, in some instances their businesses, out of
Orleans Parish ...The state is screaming for a positive economic thrust, and the consensus you
(Moffett) outline definitely points us in that direction" (Minutes of the New Orleans Business
Council, 1987). Socially and economically, thus, the movement for fiscal reform among state
and local corporate elites seemed partially driven by a sense of social responsibility, despite the
obvious benefits which would be had by corporations and business in general if the movement
were successful.
It is within the professional and the classical themes that Seider's classification scheme
appears most useful in the analysis of state and local corporate ideology. First, the theme of
professionalism predominates throughout much of the language of the proposals and the
strategies for their enactment by the legislature. LCFR's domination of technical language,
information, and general understanding of the state's fiscal climate makes its leadership role one
of professional control in comparison to mass-based social movements which conventionally
stress a layman's understanding of socially complex phenomena. In its use of technical language,
for instance, the group sought to mold public opinion behind a complex realignment of the state's
tax code by masking some controversial positions. Fiscal reform, on balance, was promoted in
the group's official publications and internal working documents as "revenue neutral" (LCFR
Legislative Program), meaning that while the state's tax system would be restructured, no new
monies to state and local government would result because additional local taxes would occur
under its proposal only with a vote of the people and any increase in property taxes resulting
from a lowering of the homestead exemption would be accompanied by a mandatory millage
"rollback" to a lower tax rate. In reality, as journalists obseNed, many citizens would pay
higher taxes, and the state over the years would experience a growth in revenues as income taxes
expanded.
The term fiscal reform itself symbolized technical control over the political debate. Most
Louisiana citizens were somewhat aware of the state's financial condition at the start of the 1988
legislative session; but few had a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of the complex
interrelationships among taxes, revenues, and expenditures which combined to produce the
state's fiscal portfolio. Moreover, the organization's insistence on the acceptance of the package
as a whole, given the vulnerable interdependence of its components--repealing the corporate
inventory and franchise taxes meant an increase in the state income tax--virtually guaranteed
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that less knowledgeable supporters of fiscal reform had to support the concept in its entirety or
face the risk of embarrassment owing to a lack of understanding. In several public forums on the
tax reform issue, the university-based economic consultants to LCFR consistently stressed the
interdependent nature of the reform package--and the need for the citizenry to accept its
component parts in their entirety (Metropolitan Area Committee, 1987). Control over the
language implied dominance over the parameters of the issue and ideological structuring of the
discussion in "growth" versus "no growth" terms.
Perhaps the most obvious symbol of technicaVprofessional control of language lay in the
group's use of the term "economic development." The economic arguments advanced by corporate
elites were such that in order to attract business and industry to the state to provide the jobs
desired by its residents, taxes on businesses had to be significantly lowered and the burden
shifted to the middle classes, chiefly homeowners who experienced the lowest property taxes in
the country (the sales tax which negatively affected the poor was to be lowered). As similar
efforts in other localities by business to advance progrowth agendas (see Stone,1976 ), no
mention was made of structural causes mirrored in the shift to an information and serviceoriented economy; and, of course, no consideration given as to alternatives to the control of the
economic system, which might lead to some redistributive benefits to the lower classes.
Economic development was synonymous with economic growth for business, with the middle
classes in Louisiana largely absorbing the additional tax burden (New Orleans
Times-Picayune,1988b: A-4).
Lastly, the control over information, typical of corporate cultures and bureaucracies in
general (Peterson, 1979; Deal & Kennedy, 1983), was vividly illustrated by the small group of
economists and attorneys who produced the complex tax package and by the largely secretive
manner in which the legislative strategy was developed (see Minutes of New Orleans Business
Council,1987). Two economists working with the group drafted the tax package which
ultimately led to the massive legislative document (1,000 pages). An economist from Louisiana
State University and another from the University of New Orleans conducted the economic
analyses which framed the constitutional amendment and the enabling legislation. Even the
legislative allies of Governor Roemer, floorleaders and chairmen of key committees, complained
that they "had no playbook."
Aside from the political strategy of withholding information up to the last possible minute
(the Legislature as a full body did not receive the complete document until less than one month
prior to the opening of the special session) the corporate practices of monopoly of information
and closed-door strategy sessions signal the emerging ideological consensus among corporate
elites for fiscal reform and for the unification of their interests. Corporate elites would employ
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a strategy of secrecy to break-up what they perceived as the logjams preventing economic
growth and, concretely, as a threat to their very livelihood, given the poor outlook for the state
economy and the unlikelihood that the oil industry could survive if it sustained any further
losses. This tight grip over information and technical control over the language of fiscal reform
stemmed directly from the corporate elites' classical ideological orientation towards the value of
"free enterprise;" and what I shall call the "privatization" ethos towards government and the
public sector. I propose an additional category of "privatization" to Seider's classical theme,
which I suggest describes the unique ideological orientation of New Orleans'
corporate elites, but which may accurately describe the national system of beliefs, values, and
attitudes towards the public sector during the Republican administration of the 1980's.
As Seider's 1974 study articulates, the classical theme embodies interrelated "core
values" (Deal & Kennedy, 1982) of corporate cultures including profit, a belief in the
unregulated free enterprise system, and in the power of the market to provide the economic
needs of society. Within fiscal reform the data suggests a division into two sub-categories:
business expansion and entrepreneurism. In the campaign for fiscal reform prior to the election
of Buddy Roemer, and in the special legislative session held less than a year after he was elected,
lCFR succeeded in building a consensus on the need to allow business to expand in louisiana.
Indeed, corporate elites could point to some very strong evidence to buttress their arguments
that the fundamental cause of the state's economic problems was the excessive tax burden carried
by business in proportion to taxes paid by individuals, especially property taxes. For example,
a study commissioned by CABl (Council for a Better louisiana) established that in louisiana
"businesses pay $300 million more in taxes than they receive in benefits" (New Orleans
Times-Picayune, 1988h:). Most strikingly, lCFR could point to the loss of 170,000 jobs
louisiana experienced between 1981 and 1988 (Wolf, cited in City Business, 1988: 7).
Thus, virtually no one questioned the need to expand business in louisiana. One state
representative, Sherman Copelin, a leader in the legislative Black Caucus, did seek to introduce
an amendment to the constitution tying a reduction in business taxes to the actual percentage of
new jobs created. Further, some legislators, mainly those from rural or suburban districts who
were opposed to the reduction in the homestead exemption, complained that business was seeking
a $300 million tax break on the "promise" of job creation (louisiana legislative Record,
1988); but in general there was little questioning of the role business was to play in economic
growth. The state's economy was simply in too bad a shape. Perhaps the most powerful evidence
of the consensus behind business expansion was the overwhelming support (70%) given by
black legislators who saw in fiscal reform a chance to lower the sales taxes and an opportunity to
spread the tax load, perhaps in the long-term assistance of local government whose constituents
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in New Orleans were the poor and minorities. Concretely, elected black officials viewed the
lowering of the homestead exemption as a chance to equalize the tax burden on their constituents,
many of whom were paying commercial property taxes via higher rents.
LCFR argued that without business expansion, Louisiana could not compete economically
with its neighbor states in the southeast region whose tax burden was considerably less. It
pointed, for example, to threats by industrial firms such as Trinity Machine Group, which was
threatening to move its headquarters from New Orleans to near-by Gulfport, Mississippi, where
the taxes on business and industry were lower. Corporate elites argued that not only would the
private sector be unable to expand job opportunities if fiscal reform failed; the state would soon
begin to witness an erosion of the companies which were already located here. Those
corporations which stood to lose the most from a failure to restructure the state's
taxes--Fortune 500 oil firms such as Moffett's Freeport-McMoran and CNG, a natural gas
company whose regional headquarters was in New Orleans--ironically were those which had the
financial and organizational resources to withstand the fiscal status quo over the longest period of
time.
Finally, the spirit of entrepreneurism especially characterized the leadership style of
corporate elites in New Orleans and in Louisiana during the push for fiscal reform. When
Moffett first moved his entire headquarters and consolidated his operations in one attractive
building on Poydras Street in New Orleans in 1985, he moved quickly to unify the corporate
community, which had historically been divided along "old" versus "new" money interests in the
city. He founded the Business Council, which as described above consisted of the fifty most
powerful chief executive officers of major corporations in New Orleans such as Tidewater, Lykes
Steamship, and Price Waterhouse (Minutes of Business Council, 1985). The Business Council
moved to provide financial and political support behind the development of the riverfront in the
form of a proposal to establish the "Aquarium of the Americas," a $15 million private/public
"partnership" which would anchor tourist-related development along the river; the construction
project was bitterly opposed by some French Quarter preservationist groups,
but--significantly--supported by the Vieux Carre Commission and by virtually all of the city's
political, financial, and civic elites. Moffett and other corporate elites in LCFR, such as the
regional president of Coca-Cola, carried the same enthusiasm for unification and activism in the
drive for fiscal reform.
These new wave of civic leaders possessed a penchant for quick decision-making and
optimism which was legendary. This attitude mirrors the "entrepreneurial" spirit. Moreover,
these corporate elites, as Whitt (1982;1984) and Seider (1974) observe seem "united in
(their) fundamental interests" (Whitt, 1982:181) and possessed the ability to brush aside
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internal conflicts. It has been already described above how the entire complex reform package
was put together, first in the corporate offices of Freeport-McMoran, and secondly, in the
governor's office in Baton Rouge, in a period of a few months. This point cannot be
overemphasized.
Prior to the arrival of out-of-town oil magnates and wildcatters such as Patrick Taylor, a
wealthy Republican who had connections to the White House, the climate of enterprise consisted
of a laissez-faire attitude, which stemmed from an upper class whose fortunes derived from
inherited wealth and property. Many residents of affluent "uptown" New Orleans successfully
defeated businesses from locating in their neighborhoods applying a preservationists ethos which
gained strict zoning regulations, such as control of small "bread and breakfast" business. Local
business elites in New Orleans historically looked neither to the state for fiscal and regulatory
relief, nor sought to expand their financial horizons independently in the market. All of this
changed with the Business Council and LCFR.

The Privatization of the Public Interest

The ideology of fiscal reform extends beyond the classical doctrine identified by Seider in
his study of the executive speeches of national business elites. In New Orleans, and throughout
the State, the fiscal reform "movement" demonstrated a political culture marked by a seeming
repugnance and contradictory attitudes towards government which I term thQ ethos of
"privatization." At its core the privatization ideology is characterized in New Orleans by a
preponderance of volunteers in government, the proliferation of private-public
"partnerships"; and the contracting of private companies for city services. Ultimately,
privatization gives legitimacy to profit. When local government can no longer maintain these
conventional services, and is "forced" to contract out to the private sector or, as is the case in
New Orleans, to rely increasingly on volunteerism, profits increase and the accumulation
process resumes, all apparently quite smoothly and "organically," as Marcuse (1981: 330)
observes. Locally, this ethos dominates because of the historically entrenched upper class whose
ownership of property in a city where land is very scarce (Whelan, 1988) virtually guaranteed
private ownership of the means of production and because of an equally historically underfunded
city government whose revenue base had substantially declined in the 1980's (see Ryan, 1988).
These historical cultural conditions provide the context for consensus building around fiscal
reform among corporate and government elites and at once lay political ground for its
compromise among voters. I return to this paradox in the conclusion of the paper.
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I would argue that this same ethos which pervades public sector attitudes in New Orleans
can also be found throughout the nation. Cities face significant fiscal and social stresses. Caught
in a "double bind", local governmental officials have little choice but to succumb to the growth
alternative (Peterson, 1982; Reed, 1988); but doing so requires additional capital and
infrastructure needs. As cities struggle to meet the requirements of growth, less capital is
available to meet essential human needs. In the context of the economic restructuring of cities,
as Smith and Keller (1983); Fainstein and Fainstein (1983) and others have shown, the role
played by business has been one of providing a catalytic effect on redevelopment efforts. In
brief, as cities grow more dependent on private capital for a percentage of operating funds and
services, owing to the economic decline in urban centers, privatization tendencies increase
proportionally.
As Whitt (1982) observes, while production becomes increasingly "social in character",
profit remains essentially private (1988:191). Because the public sector is constrained in its
abilities to raise revenues (see Peterson, 1981: 3-17), and is therefore required to promote
"developmental" policies, it assumes the role of providing the infrastructure for local industry
to function and expand, while unable to capitalize on the economic benefits (see O'Connor,
1973). The historical laissez-faire attitude towards the public sector in New Orleans,
moreover, in harsh economic times means that the city is increasingly unable to attend to the
public interest, broadly defined as those values, policies, and programs which fulfill the
"common good", (Warren, 1988 cited in Vogel & Swanson, 1989). It is in this sense, then, that
private interests now define the broad public interest in urban centers.

Conclusion

The Louisiana Legislature and the electorate ultimately rejected several variations of
fiscal reform in the first two years of the Roemer administration. The most comprehensive
version, and the most controversial, the LCFR package, was rejected by the legislature; the
other two variants, one enacting an increased state income tax, the other calling for a "dedicated"
tax to finance infrastructure improvements, were both offered to the voters in constitutional
amendments. The first failed by substantial amounts; the second passed overwhelmingly. What
accounts for the failure of fiscal reform and, conversely, for the passage of the transportation
amendment? 4 (Amendment provided $1.5 billion in infrastructure improvements state-wide,
and $400 million to New Orleans alone, coupled with a projected creation of 11,000
construction jobs for the city).
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Whalen and Young (1989) suggest that the lack of strong governmental leadership in New
Orleans, owing to "caretaker" politics in the city administration, is the cause of the defeat of tax
measures locally (and by implication, statewide). Put simply, fiscal reform, as a political
ideology designed to build coalitions with labor, blacks, and the working class, did not attract the
very people it was designed to assist with the promise of job creation--under or unemployed
minorities and blue collar workers. Indeed, among blacks, blue collar workers, and the poor,
fiscal reform attracted less than 50% of the vote (New vork Times, 1989: Y 26) in Orleans
Parish and even less in the more affluent areas. Thus despite its widespread appeal to corporate
and political elites, as a political strategy, fiscal reform fell short.
But this explanation is too simple. Why were the Moffett group and others successful in
garnering sufficient public support for redevelopment plans such as the Aquarium and the
transportation amendment but failed so badly on tax reform? On the ideological level business
elites helped create an anti-tax sentiment among voters; and the state's homestead exemption
dating to the Long era makes the protection of "property rights" (Apple, 1989) sacrosanct in the
state among middle class homeowners.
The legislators' constituents perceived the "revenue neutral" policies of LCFR as a tax
increase, paid for by middle class homeowners, to benefit large corporations, such as Moffett's
Freeport-McMoran. This most controversial measure failed to win legislative approval. More
pointedly, the income proposal (which did gain legislative approval) was proposed as a modest
increase in state income taxes, the bulk of which would fall on the upper middle class. However,
LCFR backers could not convince the electorate that a tax increase to benefit large corporations
would actually result in a net gain in jobs.
It's difficult to imagine that the corporate community, in the near future, can muster the
support necessary to eliminate the "sacred icon," (Gill, 1989, B-9) the homestead exemption,
which is enshrined in the constitution. However, the use of political ideology has limitations as a
coalition strategy for any major tax increase measure. As an explanation for the defeat of tax
reform in Louisiana it is also inadequate. The most adequate explanation is that the competing
ideological hegemony of the protection of property serves the interests of the city's active middle
class homeowners in resisting any kind of significant tax increases to support economic
development. For these tax-shielded residents, the question remains development for whom and
for what purpose? Evidence suggests that the consequences of uneven development in New
Orleans (Smith & Keller, 1984; Mumphrey & Moomau, 1984) are such that the city's
shrinking, but vocal, middle class is well secured in private police security, private and
parochial schools, and affluent volunteer city landscapers. When it comes to a question of
supporting taxes to sustain and improve city and state governmental services, therefore, the
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competing ideology of property protection effectively forestalls the consolidation of growth
politics in New Orleans with the few exceptions of riverfront redevelopment, which the
transportation amendment would help underwrite with infrastructure improvements.
In the latter case (transportation improvements, the Aquarium, the Convention Center,
etc), the use of private-public "partnerships" (see Reed, 1989: ) ideology, the perceived real
benefits to the middle class family interests, and the donation of several million dollars in
private and public funds all combine to secure passage of the minor tax increases. All of these
projects carried the tag of "dedicated taxes," which meant that, at least on the ballot, monies
generated from these taxes would be protected in a trust fund, thereby preventing "honest graft"
from recurring 5. Significantly, the fledgling corporate regime had seized control of
independent governmental bodies such as the Audubon Park Commission, the Port Authority, and
the Tourist Commission by capturing majority representation on its boards and by hiring
"bureaucratic entrepreneurs" (see Whalen & Young, 1989: 27-30) to manage and protect its
economic and political interests. This protection was assured prior to the formulation of public
policies by the state, and with little or no discussion by disenfranchised groups6.
Unlike many urban centers which witnessed the consolidation of growth machine politics
to spur urban renewal and redevelopment (cf, Stone, 1985; Fainstein & Fainstein, et ai, 1984;
Swanstrom, 1986), "dedicated growth" best characterizes New Orleans. Growth occurs most
prominently in those sectors (for example, tourism, transportation, and historic renovation)
where corporate elites have been able to seize control of quasi-independent governmental
agencies and successfully pursued public-private partnership strategies to co-opt "public
policy and resources for the risk management functions" of the private sector (Reed, 1988:
165). New Orleans, therefore, continues to remain an anomaly within the urban legacy of the
growth machine. It is the unique culture of the city and state, however, that constrains the
hegemonic goals of corporate elites, rather than more specific lack of "leadership" and poor
coalition-building skills. The findings of this study suggest that the competing ideologies of
property rights make the prospects for coalition-building in support of comprehensive growth
policies a very uncertain enterprise.
Finally, the underclass is eliminated from this ideological equation. In New Orleans, the
interests of the poor, in securing more and better low income housing, in obtaining improved
public education, in winning well-paying jobs, is not served well either by growth or property
rights ideologies. The tax reductions presented in the LCFR package, for instance, were designed
to primarily benefit large corporations, with some relief for the poor through a lower sales tax.
Continuation of the homestead exemption to protect middle income homeowners dramatically
hurts the underclass as less revenues are available for governmental services (the total loss to
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the City of New Orleans is estimated to be approximately $53 million). With the odds of
effective political organizing increasingly against them (see Piven & Cloward, 1977; also,
Fainstein & Fainstein, 1989), the inner city poor in New Orleans have little voice in the
struggle for ideological hegemony between the upper and middle classes.
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N8TES
1.

I am indebted to Ron King, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, for this
notion.

2.

Although critical theory does not constitute a unified body of thought, I generally refer to
the work associated with the "Frankfurt SchooL" According to Giroux, (1982b:8) "the
Frankfurt School took as one of its central values a commitment to penetrate the world of
objective appearances to expose the underlying social relationships they often conceal."

3.

Robert Whalen (1989:5) asserts that "the opening of the Louisiana Superdome had a
catalytic effect on tourism (as it did on downtown office space)." For instance, the number
of hotel rooms rose from 10,000 to 20,000 between 1970 and 1980.

4.

The transportation amendment would provide $1.5 billion in infrastructure
improvements state-wide and $400 million to the City of New Orleans in support of
construction activities at the Port of New Orleans, New Orleans International Airport and
various highway projects.

5.

Donald Mintz, speech before the Executive Club of New Orleans, September, 1989.

6.

Interview with Timothy P. Ryan before the Metropolitan Area Committee's Financing the
Future Coalition. October, 1988.
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